What Is Privileged Access Management (PAM)? How to Protect Admin Accounts
Why attackers go after admin accounts first, what privileged access management does and the practical steps any business can take to control admin access.
Privileged access management (PAM) is the set of tools and practices that control, monitor and protect accounts with high-level permissions, such as administrators, root and service accounts. It works by limiting who has admin rights, granting them only when needed, vaulting and rotating passwords, requiring MFA and recording privileged activity so misuse is caught quickly.
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When attackers break into a company, their first goal usually isn’t the data. It’s an admin account. With administrator rights, they can turn off security tools, create new accounts, move across the network and deploy ransomware to every machine at once.
That’s why privileged access management, or PAM, has become a core part of security programs. It’s the discipline of controlling who has “keys to the kingdom,” when they can use them and what they do with them.
This guide explains what counts as privileged access, why admin accounts are such prime targets and how to control them, whether you’re a 20-person business or a larger enterprise.
What privileged access management means
Privileged access management (PAM) is a combination of policies, processes and technology that secures accounts with high-level permissions. NIST defines a privileged account simply as a system account with the authorizations of a privileged user, meaning someone authorized to perform security-relevant functions that ordinary users can’t.
PAM typically does 4 things:
- Limits the number of privileged accounts and what each can do.
- Controls when and how those privileges are used, often granting them only for a short time.
- Protects the credentials, through vaulting, rotation and strong authentication.
- Monitors and records privileged activity so it can be audited and investigated.
PAM is a specialized part of identity and access management (IAM). IAM covers everyone’s access; PAM focuses on the small set of accounts that could do the most damage.
What counts as a privileged account
Privileged accounts are more common than most teams realize. They include:
| Account type | Examples | Why it’s risky |
|---|---|---|
| Domain and cloud admins | Active Directory Domain Admins, Microsoft 365 Global Administrator, AWS root | Control over the entire environment |
| Local administrator accounts | Admin account on each laptop or server | Often share passwords across machines |
| Service accounts | Accounts that run backups, databases or scheduled jobs | Frequently over-privileged, rarely monitored, passwords rarely change |
| Application and SaaS admins | CRM, payroll, finance and HR system admins | Access to sensitive data and money |
| Break-glass or emergency accounts | Accounts kept for when normal sign-in fails | Powerful and often forgotten |
| Machine identities and secrets | API keys, tokens, SSH keys | Embedded in code and scripts, easy to leak |
| Third-party and vendor access | IT provider or software vendor admin access | Outside your direct control |
Why admin accounts are prime targets
In October 2023, the NSA and CISA published a joint advisory on the 10 most common network misconfigurations they find in assessments. Several relate directly to privileged access:
- Improper separation of user and administrator privilege. Admins often use one account for both daily work and admin tasks, and accounts accumulate excessive permissions over time through “privilege creep.”
- High service account permissions. Service accounts often have high privileges, and attackers use techniques such as Kerberoasting to crack their credentials.
- Non-essential use of admin accounts. Using an admin account to read email or browse the web exposes it to theft from a compromised machine.
- Poor credential hygiene and weak MFA. Reused or easily cracked passwords and weak multi-factor methods make privileged accounts easier to take over.
The advisory notes that attackers actively search for privileged accounts and where they’re used. Once they have one, they can often move through a network quickly without triggering alerts. That’s also why ransomware groups prize admin access: it lets them spread encryption everywhere at once. See our guide to ransomware protection for small businesses.
Key takeaway: Every standing admin account is an opportunity for an attacker. The goal of PAM is fewer admin accounts, with fewer permissions, used for less time, with every use protected and recorded.
Core PAM capabilities
Most PAM programs, whether built with dedicated tools or native platform features, include these capabilities.
Credential vaulting and rotation
Admin passwords and keys are stored in an encrypted vault rather than in spreadsheets or people’s heads. The vault can rotate passwords automatically, so a stolen password soon stops working. For Windows local admin accounts, Microsoft’s built-in Windows LAPS feature rotates and backs up each device’s local admin password, which Microsoft says helps protect against pass-the-hash and lateral-movement attacks.
Just-in-time (JIT) access
Instead of permanent admin rights, people request admin access when they need it, for a set time. NSA and CISA recommend provisioning privileged access only when needed, with automatic expiration. Cloud platforms offer this natively; for example, Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management provides time-bound role activation that can require approval, MFA and a justification.
Strong authentication
Privileged accounts should always require MFA, ideally phishing-resistant methods such as FIDO2 security keys or passkeys. See our guide to multi-factor authentication.
Session monitoring and recording
PAM tools can broker admin sessions, record what happens and alert on risky commands. Logs should flow to your security monitoring tools, such as a SIEM.
Access reviews and discovery
Regular reviews confirm that people still need their privileges. Discovery tools find unknown admin accounts, service accounts and embedded secrets.
Dedicated PAM tools vs built-in features
You don’t always need an enterprise PAM platform to get started. Here’s how the options compare.
| Approach | Examples | Good fit for | Limitations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Built-in platform features | Microsoft Entra PIM, Windows LAPS, AWS IAM roles and IAM Identity Center | Small and mid-sized teams on 1 or 2 major platforms | Covers only that platform |
| Business password manager with shared vaults | Business tiers of common password managers | Very small teams sharing a handful of admin logins | Limited session control and JIT |
| Dedicated PAM platform | Products such as CyberArk, BeyondTrust or Delinea | Larger or regulated organizations with many systems | Cost and implementation effort |
| Managed security provider | MSP or MSSP-run PAM | Teams without in-house security staff | Depends on provider quality |
Pricing for dedicated PAM tools varies widely and is usually per user, per privileged account or per managed system, often with separate costs for implementation. Get quotes based on your actual number of admins and systems. If you’re choosing a vault for a small team, our guide on how to choose a business password manager is a good starting point.
How to start controlling privileged access
Here’s a practical sequence that works even without a dedicated PAM product.
- Inventory privileged accounts. List every admin account across your domain, cloud, SaaS apps, servers and network devices, plus service accounts and API keys.
- Remove what isn’t needed. Delete stale accounts and strip unnecessary admin rights. Apply the principle of least privilege.
- Separate admin and daily accounts. Admins should use a standard account for email and browsing, and a separate admin account only for admin work.
- Require phishing-resistant MFA on every privileged account.
- Vault and rotate credentials. Move shared admin passwords into a vault and turn on Windows LAPS for local admin accounts.
- Turn on just-in-time access where your platforms support it, starting with your most powerful roles.
- Lock down service accounts. Give them only the permissions they need, run services as non-admin where possible and rotate their credentials.
- Control vendor access. Grant third parties time-limited access, require MFA and log their sessions.
- Log and review. Send privileged activity logs to a central location and review access quarterly.
- Protect break-glass accounts. Keep 1 or 2 emergency accounts with strong credentials stored securely, and alert whenever they’re used.
These steps line up with the account and access safeguards in CIS Controls Implementation Group 1, and they’re a core part of a zero trust security approach.
Common PAM mistakes to avoid
- Treating PAM as a one-time project. New admin accounts appear constantly; discovery and reviews must be ongoing.
- Ignoring service accounts and secrets. They’re often the most privileged and least monitored accounts in the environment.
- Too many Global Administrators. Use narrower admin roles for specific tasks.
- Forgetting offboarding. Departing admins and vendors must lose access immediately. Use an offboarding checklist.
- Making the process so painful people bypass it. Fast, simple JIT requests keep people inside the controls.
Conclusion
Privileged access management comes down to a simple idea: the accounts that can do the most damage deserve the most protection. Start by finding every admin account, cutting the ones you don’t need, separating admin work from daily work and requiring strong MFA. Then add vaulting, just-in-time access and monitoring as your tools and budget allow. Each step makes it much harder for an attacker to turn one stolen password into a company-wide incident.
Sources
- NSA and CISA: Top Ten Cybersecurity Misconfigurations (AA23-278A) — privilege-related misconfigurations and recommended mitigations
- NIST CSRC Glossary: Privileged account — definition of a privileged account
- Microsoft Learn: What is Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management? — just-in-time and time-bound role activation features
- Microsoft Learn: Windows LAPS overview — local administrator password rotation and supported platforms
Frequently asked questions
What is the difference between PAM and IAM?
Identity and access management (IAM) governs access for every user, covering sign-in, single sign-on, provisioning and permissions. Privileged access management (PAM) is a specialized subset focused on accounts with admin-level rights, like admins, root and service accounts. PAM adds extra controls such as credential vaulting, just-in-time admin access and session recording for the accounts that can do the most damage.
Does a small business need privileged access management?
Yes, though not necessarily a dedicated PAM product. Small businesses still have admin accounts for Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, laptops, banking and payroll. Start with basics: few admins, separate admin accounts, phishing-resistant MFA, a password vault and built-in features like Windows LAPS or Entra PIM. Consider a dedicated tool as your systems and regulatory needs grow.
What is just-in-time privileged access?
Just-in-time (JIT) access grants admin permissions only when someone needs them, for a limited time, and then removes them automatically. Instead of standing admin rights, a user requests a role, may need approval and MFA, and the access expires. NSA and CISA recommend this approach because it shrinks the window an attacker has to abuse a privileged account.
How much does privileged access management cost?
Costs vary widely. Dedicated PAM platforms are usually priced per user, per privileged account or per managed system, with possible implementation fees, so get quotes based on your environment. Many organizations start with lower-cost built-in options such as Windows LAPS, which Microsoft provides at no extra cost, or cloud features like Entra PIM included in certain licenses.
What is a privileged account?
A privileged account is an account with permissions beyond those of a standard user, such as the ability to change system settings, install software, manage other accounts or access sensitive data. Examples include domain admins, cloud global administrators, local admin accounts, root accounts, service accounts and SaaS admin roles. NIST defines it as a system account with a privileged user's authorizations.
Why are service accounts a security risk?
Service accounts run applications, backups and scheduled tasks, and they're often given broad permissions and passwords that never change. Nobody signs in to them interactively, so misuse can go unnoticed. NSA and CISA warn that attackers target these accounts, sometimes cracking their credentials. Limit their permissions, rotate credentials and monitor their activity.
Should admins use separate accounts?
Yes. Admins should use a standard account for email, web browsing and daily work, and a separate account only for administrative tasks. NSA and CISA list non-essential use of privileged accounts as a common misconfiguration, because reading email with an admin account exposes it to phishing and malware. Separate accounts also make admin activity easier to monitor.
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